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Abstract
In this paper, the one-sided secrecy of two-way wiretap channel with feedback is investigated, where the confidential messages
of one user through multiple transmissions is guaranteed secure against an external eavesdropper. For one thing, one-sided secrecy
satisfies the secure demand of many practical scenarios. For another, the secrecy is measured over many blocks since the correlation
between eavesdropper’s observation and the confidential messages in successive blocks, instead of secrecy measurement of one
block in previous works. Thus, firstly, an achievable secrecy rate region is derived for the general two-way wiretap channel with
feedback through multiple transmissions under one-sided secrecy. Secondly, outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region are also
obtained. The gap between inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region is explored via the binary input two-way wiretap
channels. Most notably, the secrecy capacity regions are established for the XOR channel. Furthermore, the result shows that the
achievable rate region with feedback is larger than that without feedback. Therefore, the benefit role of feedback is precisely
characterized for two-way wiretap channel with feedback under one-sided secrecy.
Index Terms
two-way wiretap channel, secrecy capacity, feedback, achievable secrecy rate region, one-sided secrecy
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The feedback of wiretap channel
The secure communication via a wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner in [1], where he proved the possibility to achieve
a positive secrecy transmission rate without any private key. Wyner studied a noisy degraded broadcast channel and determined
its secrecy capacity, defined to be the maximum transmission rate under a weak secrecy constraint (i.e., the rate of information
leaked to the eavesdropper is vanishing). Later, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner extended Wyner’s work to the general broadcast wiretap
channel with a confidential message [2].
Notably, in wiretap channel, the positive secrecy rate demands that the legitimate receiver should have a better observation
than the eavesdropper does [1], [2]. Whereas, in case of a strong eavesdropper who has a better channel than the legitimate
receiver does, the works of Maurer, Ahlswede and Csisza´r have shown that a positive secret key generation rate can be achieved
by establishing a public feedback channel [3], [4]. Thereafter, inspired by the benefit of feedback, a large number of works
investigated the role of feedback in various wiretap channel [5]–[10]. Considering the usage of feedback signal, one class of
works sends the feedback back to the channel in order to help confuse the eavesdropper. For example, Ahlswede and Cai
[5] demonstrated that the noiseless feedback from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter can increase the secrecy capacity
of the wiretap channel. Lai, El Gamal, and Poor [9], studied the modulo-additive wiretap channel, where Eve receives the
modulo-sum of the source signal, the feedback signal, and the noise. They showed that if Bob jams Eve completely, then Alice
can send messages securely at the capacity of the channel to Bob. Another class of works combines the feedback signal and
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2the secret-key exchange mechanism in encoding scheme. For instance, in [10], feedback signal is utilized as a secret key in
one-time pad to derive a higher secrecy rate.
B. Two-way wiretap channel
As a classic multi-users communication model, two-way channel was first studied by Shannon [11], where two users intend
to exchange messages with each other. In the presence of an external eavesdropper, this communication scenario is modeled
as the two-way wiretap channel. Tekin and Yener firstly studied the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel [12], [13], where an
achievable secrecy rate region was derived and the cooperative jamming was proposed to increase the achievable secrecy rate.
The affect of feedback in two-way wiretap channel was investigated in Gaussian two-way wiretap channel [14] and in the
general two-way wiretap channel [15], [16]. For Gaussian two-way wiretap channel, the previous received messages was used
as feedback and sent into the forward channel to confuse the eavesdropper [14]. Through this method, the achievable secrecy
rate is improved than that in [12]. For the general two-way wiretap channel, achievable secrecy rate regions were derived in
[15] and [16] respectively, both of which took the previous messages as feedback and used feedback signal in a secrect-key
exchange mechanism to keep the messages confidential. Specially, the work [16] studied the two-way wiretap channel under a
strong secrecy constraint, where the amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper, rather than the leakage rate is required
to vanish in the limit of the number of channel uses.
So far, these works on the two-way wiretap channel focus on the role of feedback with joint secrecy, where both of the two
confidential messages are kept secure. However, in many practical communication scenarios, the secrecy requirement may not
as strong as the joint secrecy. For instance, in a question-answer communication scenario, two legitimate users communicate
with each other over a two-way channel in presence of an external eavesdropper. Usually, one terminal sends a public question
and the other gives a private answer. When considering a weaker secrecy constraint than the joint secrecy, we can only keep the
answer confidential from the eavesdropper, instead both the public question and private answer. This scenario can be modeled
as a two-way wiretap channel with one-sided secrecy. Although one-sided secrecy constraint is by definition weaker than the
joint secrecy, it nevertheless provides an acceptable secrecy for many practical communication scenarios.
From previous works, it is known that both cooperative jamming and feedback have been highlighted to increase the secure
communication rates in the two-way wiretap channel. In addition, with the full-duplex destination, regarding that the two users’
observations are correlated to two users’ messages, each legitimate user can generate the feedback signal from part of the
received messages with the knowledge of its own message, while the eavesdropped can not gain more information because of
the security of feedback. Hence, it is interesting to study the impact of cooperative jamming and feedback in two-way wiretap
channel under the practical one-sided secrecy constraint.
Moreover, in this paper by block Markov coding the previous messages of one user is regarded as feedback for the other
user, further encrypting the confidential message in one-time pad scheme. Since the channel output is related to both users’
messages, such that for one transmission the channel output is not only related to the massages of this transmission, but also
related to the messages of previous transmission. Therefore, the information leakage to the eavesdropper should be measured
over several transmissions. However, in previous studies of two-way wiretap channel with feedback, the information leakage
is investigated for one transmission to explore the role of feedback. Despite the discussion above, the role of feedback in
two-way wiretap involving several transmissions is a problem to be solved.
C. Contributions of This Paper and Organization
Motivated by the meaning of one-sided secrecy and feedback, we investigate the one-sided secrecy over b transmissions
of the two-way wiretap channel, which requires the information leakage of the confidential message over b transmissions
to vanish. Under this secrecy constraint, an achievable secrecy rate region for the two-way wiretap is derived by the block
Markov coding and the cooperative jamming mechanism. Further, the achievable secrecy rate region is explored in binary-input
channels. Notably, the secrecy capacity region is fully characterized for the XOR channel. The result shows that the achievable
3secrecy rate region is larger than that without feedback. Hence, the benefit role of feedback is precisely characterized through
multiple transmissions for two-way wiretap channel with one-sided secrecy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide the general system model together with the preliminary
definitions which will be utilized throughout the paper. An achievable one-sided secrecy rate region and an outer bound on
the one-sided secrecy capacity region are proposed in Section III-A. These results are explored in the binary input two-way
wiretap channel in Section IV. To enhance the flow of the paper, the detailed proofs are collected in the appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Model
User 1 User 2
Mˆ2 Decoder 1
Main Channel
Decoder 2 Mˆ1
M1 Encoder 1 Encoder 2 M2
Wiretap Channel
Xn1 X
n
2
Y n1 Y
n
2
Xn1 X
n
2
Zn Eavesdropper
Fig. 1. Two-way wiretap channel with an external eavesdropper.
The full-duplex two-way wiretap channel is shown in Fig. 1, where two legitimate users intend to exchange messages with
each other in the presence of an external eavesdropper, and each of users is equipped with a transmitter and a receiver that
can operate simultaneously. In this paper, we focus on the one-sided secrecy, where only the messages from the user is kept
confidential from the eavesdropper. Without loss of generality, assume that only the message from the legitimate user 1 should
be kept secure, while the message from user 2 is an open message. In this paper, the propose Markov block coding scheme
involves b transmissions, during which the confidential messages are sent from 2nd to the b-th transmission. We call each
transmission one block. Before introduce the system, we first introduce the notations and terminologies used later.
• C1, C2 are the codebooks of user 1 and user 2, respectively.
• M1(j) = (M1,1(j),M1,2(j), · · · ,M1,n(j)) denotes the n length message of user 1 in the j-th block. Correspondingly,
(M1)
b
j represents the j, j + 1, · · · , b-th message from User 1, and (M1)j represents the j messages of user 1.
• Similarly, M2(j) = (M2,1(j),M2,2(j), · · · ,M2,n(j)) denotes the n length message of user 2 in the j-th block. (M2)bj
represents the j, j + 1, · · · , b-th message of User 2, and (M2)j represents the j messages of user 2.
• Zj = (Z(1),Z(2), · · · ,Z(j)) denotes the messages received by the eavesdropper from j blocks, where
Z(j) = (Z1(j), Z2(j), · · · , Zn(j)) is the n length message received in the j-th block.
SupposeM1,M2 to be the message sets of user 1 and user 2, respectively; X1, X2 to be the finite channel input alphabets at
user 1 and user 2, respectively; Y1, Y2, Z are the channel output alphabets at user 1, user 2 and the eavesdropper, respectively.
The discrete memoryless two-way wiretap channel is characterized by the transition probability distribution p(y1, y2, z|x1, x2),
where x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2 are the channel inputs from user 1 and 2; y1 ∈ Y1, y2 ∈ Y2 and z ∈ Z are channel outputs at user
1, user 2 and the eavesdropper.
Suppose in block j − 1, the channel output at user 1 and user 2 are Y n1 (j − 1) and Y n2 (j − 1), respectively. User 1 decodes
Y n1 (j − 1) and obtains the messages from user 2, part of which was taken as the feedback signal for next block denoted by
Y nf (j − 1). In block j, the legitimate user 1 wants to transmit a confidential message M1 ∈ M1 to user 2. According to the
4feedback Y nf (j− 1) and M1, the corresponding codeword Xn1 ∈ X1 is chosen and sent at a secure rate R1s = 1nH(M1). The
legitimate user 2 wants to transmit a non-secure message M2(j) ∈ M2 to user 1. The corresponding codeword Xn2 ∈ X2 is
sent at a transmission rate R2 = 1nH(M2).
A (2nR1s , 2nR2 , n) code for the two-way channel consists of the following.
• Two independent message sets M1 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1s} and M2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2}.
• For each transmission, two messages: M1 and M2 are independent and uniformly distributed over M1 and M2,
respectively.
• Two stochastic encoders, f1 at user 1: (M1(j), Y nf (j−1))→ Xn1 (j) which maps the message M1(j) ∈M1 and feedback
signal Y ′1(j − 1) to a codeword Xn1 (j) ∈ Xn1 , and f2 at user 2, for each transmission: M2(j)→ Xn2 (j), which maps the
message M2(j) ∈M2 to a codeword Xn2 (j) ∈ Xn2 (j).
• Two decoders, g1 at user 1, for each transmission: (Y n1 , X
n
1 )→ Mˆ2 which maps a received sequence Y n1 to a message
Mˆ2; g2 at user 2: (Yn2 ,Xn2 )→ Mˆ1 which maps a received sequence Y n2 to a message Mˆ1.
The two-way communication is governed by reliability and secrecy. The former is measured by the error probability and
the secrecy levels, respectively. The average error probabilities of decoding at legitimate user 1 and 2 are defined as
Pe,1 =
1
2nR2
2nR2∑
M2=1
Pr{Mˆ2 6=M2};
Pe,2 =
1
2nR1s
2nR1s∑
M1=1
Pr{Mˆ1 6=M1}. (1)
The one-sided secrecy of the whole b blocks is defined as
1
n
I((M1)
b
2;Z
b) ≤ τn, lim
n→∞ τn = 0, (2)
where (M1)b2 = {M1(2),M1(3), · · · ,M1(b)} is the confidential messages from the 2nd to the b-th block; M1(j) denotes the
n length message in the j-th block; Zb is the received messages at the eavesdropper in b blocks.
Remark 1. Note that the joint secrecy [15], [16] is defined in one block as
1
n
I(M1,M2;Z) ≤ τn, lim
n→∞ τn = 0, (3)
where M1 and M2 are the message in one transmission of user 1 and user 2, respectively.
Comparing the one-sided secrecy constraint (2) with the joint secrecy constraint (3), the joint secrecy requires the information
leakage rate of both the messages M1 and M2 is demanded vanishing, while the one-sided secrecy requires the information
leakage rate of the messages M1)b2 over b− 1 blocks vanishing.
Definition 1. The rate pair (R1s, R2) is said to be achievable under one-sided secrecy, if there exists a sequence of (2nR1s , 2nR2 , n)
codes with R1s = 1nH(M1) and R2 =
1
nH(M2) such that
Pe,i ≤ n, for i = 1, 2 (4)
1
n
I((M1)
b
2;Z
b) ≤ τn, (5)
lim
n→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ τn = 0. (6)
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we establish an achievable one-sided secrecy rate region for the two-way wiretap channel with feedback
through multiple transmissions. An outer bound on secrecy capacity is also derived.
5A. One-sided security with cooperative coding
In order to bound the leakage rate through multiple transmissions, we first give the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let (U1, U2, Z) ∼ p(u1, u2, z), and  > 0. Denote Un1 (l1), Un2 (l2), l1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ], l2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ] as
random sequences of two users, and each distributed according to
∏n
i=1 PU1(u1i),
∏n
i=1 PU2(u2i). C1, C2 are the codebooks
which contain the all Un1 (l1), U
n
2 (l2) sequences, C1 = {Un1 (1), Un1 (2), . . . Un1 (2nR1)}, C2 = {Un2 (1), Un2 (2), . . . Un2 (2nR2)}.
Let L1, L2 be random indexes with an arbitrary probability mass function. If R1 + R2 ≥ I(U1U2;Z), R1 ≥ I(U1;Z),
R2 ≥ I(U2;Z), then H(L1L2|C1C2Z(j)) ≤ n(R1 +R2 − I(U1U2;Z) + δ′(ε)).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Based on the lemma 1, considering the one-sided information leakage over b blocks, i.e. (2), we establish the following
achievable secrecy rate region for the two-way wiretap channel with feedback through multiple transmissions.
Theorem 1. For the two-way wiretap channel with feedback under one-sided secrecy constraint, an achievable secrecy rate
region is given by
RIn M= Conv{
⋃
p∈P
RIn(p)}
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables U1, U2, X1, X2 satisfying
p(q, u1, x1, u2, x2) = p(q)p(u1|q)p(u2|q)p(x1|u1)p(x2|u2).
RIn(p) is the region of rate pairs (R1s, R2) for p ∈ P , satisfying
(R1s, R2) :
R1s ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1s ≤ min{I(U1;Y2|X2, Q) + I(U2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(U1U2;Z), I(U1;Y2|X2, Q)− I(U1;Z)},
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y1|X1).
I(U2;Y1|X1, Q) ≥ I(U2;Z).

(7)
Proof: See the proof in Appendix B.
Here, we outline the proof to illustrate the main ideas. Our coding scheme involves the transmission of b− 1 independent
messages over b n-transmission blocks.
• During the b blocks, user 1 sends a confidential message M1(j) from the block j = 2 to the block j = b. For each
transmission, the message M1(j) in the block j ∈ [2 : b] is split into two independent message pieces (M1u(j),M1s(j)),
where M1u(j) ∈ [1 : 2nR1u ], M1s(j) ∈ [1 : 2nR1s ] with R1s = R1u + R1s. R1u, R1s are the transmission rates of
M1u(j) and M1s(j), respectively, and R1s denotes the secure transmission rate of user 1.
User 2 sends a confidential key K2(1) in block 1, a message M2(j) and a confidential key K2(j) in block 2 ≤ j ≤ b
with M2(j) ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ], K(j) ∈ [1 : 2nR2k ] with R2 = R2 +R2k +R2x. R2, R2k are the transmission rates of M2(j)
and K(j), respectively.
• The codebook of user 1 consists 2nR1 randomly generated i.i.d. sequences un1 (l1), l1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ]. It is partitioned
into 2nR1u equal-size bin C1(M1u), further each bin is partitioned into 2nR1s equal-size sub-bin C1(M1u,M1s). The
codebook of user 2 consists 2nR2 randomly generated i.i.d. sequences un2 (l2), l2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ]. It is equally partitioned
into 2nR2 bin C2(M2), further each bin is equally partitioned into 2nR2k sub-bin C2(M2,K2).
• In the first block, user 2 randomly selects a codeword un2 (l2) from the sub-bin C2(M2(1),K2(1)), and generates the
channel input xn2 (1) ∼
∏n
i=1 p(x21(i)|u2(i)). User 1 does not send any message in the first block, only decodes the key
K2(1) at the end of the first block. Such that in the first block R1u = R1s = R2 = 0. However, the impact on the whole
achievable rate diminishes as the number of blocks b→∞.
6• In block j ∈ [2 : b], to send the message M1(j) = (M1u(j),M1s(j)), M1u(j) is encrypted into M′1u(j) by K2(j − 1)
received from the previous block from user 2, i.e. M′1u(j) =M1u(j)⊕K2(j− 1). A codeword un1 (l1) in block j is ran-
domly selected in sub-bin C1(M′1u(j),M1s(j)). The channel input x
n
1 (j) is generated by x
n
1 (j) ∼
∏n
i=1 p(x1j(i)|u1(i)).
On the other hand, user 2 sends a key K2(j) in addition to the public message M2(j). The codeword un2 (l2) is randomly
chosen in sub-bin C2(M2(j),K2(j)). Then the channel input xn2 (j) is generated by x
n
2 (j) ∼
∏n
i=1 p(x2j(i)|u2(i)).
In the coding scheme, the cooperative jamming is used to improve the secrecy rate of the confidential message of user 1 by
the jamming from user 2. The cooperative jamming can be interpreted by channel prefixing mechanism [17], which means
prefixing an artificial discrete memoryless channel before the communication channel. In the proposed coding scheme,
the codewords un1 and u
n
2 are drawn from two random binning codebooks, and passed into two prefixing channels to
generate the channel inputs xn1 and x
n
2 , respectively.
• Each decoder uses the joint typical decoding together with the knowledge of its own codewords. In each block, the
legitimate user decodes the channel output and obtains the message from the other user with rather small average error
probability.
• From block 2 to block b, b− 1 confidential messages (M1)b2 are sent and should be kept secure from the eavesdropper.
The one-sided secrecy constraint through the whole b block is measured by
1
n
I((M1)
b
2;Z
b|C1C2) ≤ τn, lim
n→∞ τn = 0. (8)
Applying theorem 1 to a special two-way channel where the legitimate users and eavesdropper have the same channel output,
i.e. Y1 = Y2 = Z, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For the two-way wiretap channel, if the legitimate users and eavesdropper have the same channel output, i.e.
Y1 = Y2 = Z, an achievable one-sided secrecy rate region is the union of non-negative rate pairs (R1s, R2) ∈ RIn1 satisfying
R2 ≤I(X2;Z|X1)
R1s ≤I(U1;Z|X2) + I(U2;Z|X1)− I(U1U2;Z) if I(U2;Z|X1) < I(U2;Z|U1)
I(U1;Z|X2)− I(U1;Z) if I(U2;Z|X1) ≥ I(U2;Z|U1)
over all p(x1, x2).
B. An outer bound of two-way wiretap channel
Theorem 2. For the two-way wiretap channel with feedback under one-sided secrecy constraint, an outer bound on secrecy
capacity region is
RO M= Conv{
⋃
p∈P
RO(p)}
where P denotes the set of all distribution of the random variables U , V , X1, X2 satisfying
p(q, u, v, x1, x2) = p(q)p(u|q)p(v|u)p(x1x2|uv).
RO(p) is the region of rate pairs (R1s, R2) for p ∈ P , satisfying
R2 ≤I(X2;Y1|X1),
R1s ≤min{I(V ;X2, Y2|U)− I(V ;Z|U), I(V ;X1, Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U)}, (9)
where U → V → (X1, X2)→ (Y1, Y2, Z) forms a Markov Chain.
Proof: See the proof in Appendix C.
7Corollary 2. For the two-way wiretap channel, if the legitimate users and eavesdropper have the same channel output, i.e.
Y1 = Y2 = Z, the outer bound on secrecy capacity region is the union of non-negative rate pairs (R1s, R2) ∈ RO1 satisfying
R2 ≤I(X2;Z|X1),
R1s ≤min{H(X1|Z), H(X2|Z)}
Proof: Applying the outer bound given in (9), we have
R1s
(a)
= I(V ;X2, Z|U)− I(V ;Z|U)
=I(V ;X2|U,Z)
≤H(X2|U,Z)
(b)
≤H(X2|Z)
where (a) follows from Z = Y2; (b) is due to the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy. A similar proof can be
applied to show that R1s ≤ H(X1|Z).
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we consider the binary-input two-way wiretap channels for numerical illustrations. In particular, we assume
that all the terminals have the same observations, i.e., Y1 = Y2 = Z.
If restricting to the binary-input (i.e., x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}) and binary-output (i.e., y1 = y2 = z ∈ {0, 1}) deterministic
two-way channels, there are in total 16 transition possibilities. Among them, only two transition possibilities could have
positive transmission rates at both legitimate users. The transmission diagrams of these channels are shown in Fig. 2 (a) and
(b), referred as the binary Multiplying channel (BMC) and the XOR channel, respectively. If allowing ternary outputs (i.e.,
y1 = y2 = z ∈ {0, 1, 2}), the Adder channel, as shown in Fig. 2 (c), is also interesting.
For each channel, the numerical result consists of the achievable secrecy rate region with feedback (according to Theorem
1), the achievable secrecy rate region without feedback and the outer bound on secrecy capacity (according to Corollary 2).
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0 1
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x1
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0 1
0
1
0 1
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x2
0 1
0
1
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1 2
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Fig. 2. Transition diagram of the binary-input two-way channels.
A. Binary Multiplying channel
The transmission diagrams of BMC is shown in Fig. 2 (a), where the channel output is represented by Y1 = Y2 = Z = X1·X2.
By Theorem 1, the achievable secrecy rate region RCo−in with feedback is drawn with X1X2 ∼ Pr(p1p2). Correspondingly
the outer bound RO on secrecy capacity and the achievable secrecy rate region RInd−in without feedback are also derived
for comparison.
Seen from Fig. 3, clearly the achievable rate region RCo−in is larger than RInd−in, which indicates the benefit of feedback
in improving the secrecy rate in two-way wiretap channel. This phenomenon is more obviously for the binary XOR channel.
However the gap between the achievable rate region RCo−in and the outer bound RO is still large.
B. Binary XOR channel
The channel is shown in Fig. 2 (b), where the channel output is represented by Y1 = Y2 = Z = X1 ⊕X2. For the Binary
XOR channel, we draw the curves of the achievable secrecy regions RInd−in without feedback, RCo−in with feedback and
the outer bound RO, respectively.
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Fig. 3. BMC with one-sided secrecy: achievable regions & outer bound.
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Fig. 4. Binary XOR channel with one-sided secrecy: achievable regions & outer bound.
In Fig. 4, both RCo−in and RInd−in can achieve the maximum transmission rate i.e., maxR1s = maxR2 = 1. Specially,
the point (R1s, R2) = (1, 0) can be achieved by C2 ∼ Bern(1), X2 ∼ Bern(1/2) and C1 = X1 ∼ Bern(1/2). At this point,
user 2 is transmitting random bits (i.e., X2 ∼ Bern(1/2)) but messages (since C2 ∼ Bern(1) and thus R2 = 0). These random
bits work as the cooperative jamming to help the secret transmission of user 1. In this way, the secret transmission rate R1s is
increased. Note that, according to Corollary 2, the outer bound satisfies R1s ≤ 1, R2 ≤ 1, coinciding with RCo−in. Therefore,
for the Binary XOR channel, the one-sided secrecy capacity region is established.
C. Adder channel
The channel is shown in Fig. 2 (c), where the channel output is represented by Y1 = Y2 = Z = X1 +X2. The achievable
one-sided secrecy rate regions RInd−in without feedback, RCo−in with feedback and the outer bound RO are shown in Fig.
5.
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Fig. 5. Adder channel with one-sided secrecy: achievable regions & outer bound.
Similar to the behavior at the BMC, the achievable rate region RCo−in with feedback is larger than RInd−in without
feedback. Under the one-sided secrecy constraint, the maximum achievable rates at both users are maxR1s = 0.5 and maxR2 =
1, respectively. Remarkably, for user 1, there is 50% rate loss compared to the maximum transmission rate in case of no secrecy
constraint.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: For the simultaneous joint typical decoding, we first define the following events:
• E = {(Un1 (L1), Un2 (L2), Zn) /∈ T (n) };
• E1 = {(Un1 (L1), Un2 (L2), Zn) ∈ T (n) };
• E2 = {(Un1 (t1), Un2 (t2), Zn) ∈ T (n) , t1 6= L1, t2 6= L2};
• E3 = {(Un1 (L1), Un2 (t2), Zn) ∈ T (n) , t2 6= L2};
• E4 = {(Un1 (t1), Un2 (L2), Zn) ∈ T (n) , t1 6= L1};
Based on the definition of the events above, we have the following properties.
• By LLN, the first event P{E = 1} = P{E} tends to zero as n→∞.
• For event E1, define
N(Zn, Un1 (L1), U
n
2 (L2)) =|{(Un1 (L1), Un2 (L2), Zn) ∈ T (n) }| = 1.
• For event E2, define
N(Zn, Un1 (t1), U
n
2 (t2)) =|{t1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ], t2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ] :
(Un1 (t1), U
n
2 (t2), Z
n) ∈ T (n) , t1 6= L1, t2 6= L2}|
≤
2nR1∑
t1=1,t1 6=L1
2nR2∑
t2=1,t2 6=L2
Pr{(Un1 (t1), Un2 (t2), Zn) ∈ T (n) }
≤2n(R1+R2−I(U1U2;Z)+δ(ε)).
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• For event E3, define
N(Zn, Un1 (L1), U
n
2 (t2)) =|{t2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ] : (Un1 (L1), Un2 (t2), Zn) ∈ T (n) }|
≤
2nR2∑
t2=1,t2 6=L2
Pr{(Un1 (L1), Un2 (t2), Zn) ∈ T (n) }
≤2n(R2−I(U2;ZU1)+δ(ε)).
• For event E4, define
N(Zn, Un1 (t1), U
n
2 (L2)) =|{t1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ] : (Un1 (t1), Un2 (L2), Zn) ∈ T (n) }|
≤
2nR1∑
t1=1,t1 6=L1
Pr{(Un1 (t1), Un2 (L2), Zn) ∈ T (n) }
≤2n(R1−I(U1;ZU2)+δ(ε))
Define E = 1 if E occurs. E = 0 if events E1 occures and any of E2, E3, E4 occur.
Hence,
P (E = 0)H(L1L2|C1C2Z(j), E = 0)
≤P (E = 0) log2[1 + 2n(R1+R2−I(U1U2;Z)+δ(ε)) + 2n(R2−I(U2;ZU1)+δ(ε)) + 2n(R1−I(U1;ZU2)+δ(ε))]
≤ log2[2n(R1+R2−I(U1U2;Z)+δ(ε))(2−n(R1+R2−I(U1U2;Z)+δ(ε)) + 1 + 2−n(R2−I(U2;Z)) + 2−n(R1−I(U1;Z)))]
(a)
≤n[R1 +R2 − I(U1U2;Z) + δ(ε)] + 2 (10)
where (a) follows from that if R1 +R2 ≥ I(U1U2;Z), R2 ≥ I(U2;Z) and R1 ≥ I(U1;Z).
Therefore,
H(L1L2E|C1C2Z(j))
=H(E|C1C2) +H(L1L2|C1C2Z(j)E)
≤1 + P (E = 1)H(L1L2|C1C2Z(j), E = 1) + P (E = 0)H(L1L2|C1C2Z(j), E = 0)
(a)
≤1 + P (E = 1)n(R1 +R2) + n[R1 +R2 − I(U1U2;Z) + δ(ε)] + 2
(b)
=1 + n(R1 +R2 − I(U1U2;Z) + δ(ε)) + 2
=n[R1 +R2 − I(U1U2;Z) + δ(ε) + 1
n
] + δ′1(ε)
where (a) the second term follows from that H(L1L2|C1C2Z(j), E = 1) ≤ n(R1 + R2), and the third term follows from the
above (10); (b) follows from that P (E = 1)→ 0 as n→∞. Such that H(L1L2|C1C2Z(j)) ≤ n(R1+R2−I(U1U2;Z)+δ′(ε)),
if R1 +R2 ≥ I(U1U2;Z), R2 ≥ I(U2;Z) and R1 ≥ I(U1;Z).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The transmission is performed for B blocks of length n, where both B and n are sufficiently large. With fixed probabilities
density function p(q), p(u1|q) and p(u2|q), the random code generation is described as follows.
A. Codebook Generation:
1) Codebook generation: With the fixed p(q), generate a sequence qn, where each of its element is i.i.d. and randomly
chosen according to p(q). The sequence qn is then sent to two users before the communication.
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• User 1: For a given distribution p(u1|q) and the sequence qn, randomly generate i.i.d. sequences un1 (l1) = un1 (M1u,M1s,M1x)
where l1 ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ], R1 ≥ R1u + R1s, with R1 = R1u + R1s + R1x. Partition sequences un1 (l1) (l ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ]) into
2nR1u equal-size bin C1(M1u), where M1u ∈ [1 : 2nR1u ]. Further partition each bin C1(M1u) into 2nR1s equal-size
sub-bin C1(M1u,M1s).
• User 2: For a given distribution p(u2|q) and the sequence qn, generate i.i.d. sequences un2 (l2) = un2 (M2,K2,M2x) where
l2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ], R2 ≥ R2 +R2k, let R2 = R2 +R2k +R2x. Partition sequences un2 (l2) ([1 : 2nR2 ]) into 2nR2 equal-size
bin C2(M2), where M2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ]. Further partition each bin C2(M2) into 2nR2k equal-size sub-bin C2(M2,K2).
B. Encoding
We use block coding scheme to transmit messages over b transmissions blocks. In the first block, only user 2 sends a key
message K2(1) to user 1. The user 2 randomly selects an index l2 ∈ C2(M2(1),K2(1)); and uses the corresponding un2 (l2)
to generate the symbol xn2 (1) ∼
∏n
i=1 p(x2i|u2i). And send the symbols xn2 (1) to user 1.
In the next block j ≥ 2, the encoding scheme is described as follows. Suppose that user 1 intends to send the confidential
message M1(j) = (M1u(j),M1s(j)). Then it encodes the message in the following steps.
1) M1u(j) is encrypted into M′1u(j) by the key K2(j − 1) received from user 2 in block j − 1, as M′1u(j) =M1u(j)⊕
K2(j − 1). Under security constraint, it must satisfy R1u ≤ R2k.
2) A codeword un1 (l1) for block j is randomly selected from sub-bin C1(M
′
1u(j),M1s(j)). The channel input x
n
1 (j) is
generated by xn1 (j) ∼
∏n
i=1 p(x1i|u1i).
Suppose that user 2 intends to send the message M2(j), and the key K2(j) ∈ K. The codeword un2 (l2) is randomly chosen
from sub-bin C2(M2(j),K2(j)). Then the channel input xn2 (j) is generated by x
n
2 (j) ∼
∏n
i=1 p(x2i|u2i).
C. Decoding
In the j-th block, user 1 declares that Mˆ2(j) is sent by user 2 if un2 (Mˆ2(j),K2(j),M2x(j)) is the unique sequence such that
(qn, un2 (Mˆ2(j),K2(j),M2x(j)), y
n
1 (j), x
n
1 (j)) ∈ Tn1,ε. User 2 declares that Mˆ′1u(j) is sent by user 1 if un1 (Mˆ′1u(j),M1s(j),M1x(j))
is the unique sequence such that (qn, un1 (Mˆ
′
1u(j),M1s(j),M1x(j)), y
n
2 (j), x
n
2 (j)) ∈ Tn2,ε. User 2 recovers M1u(j) by
M1u(j) = Mˆ
′
1u(j)⊕K2(j − 1).
D. Reliability
Assume that M1s(j) = 1, M′1u(j) = 1, M2(j) = 1, K2(j) = 1 are sent, and the corresponding codeword u
n
1 (l1 =
1), un2 (l2 = 1).
First we consider the error probability at user 1. A decoding error happens at user 1 if at least one of the following events
occur
1) E11: Given qn, the codeword un2 (1) and (xn1 , yn1 ) are not jointly typical, i.e. E11 = {(qn, un2 (l2), yn1 , xn1 ) /∈ Tn1,ε};
2) E1i, i 6= 1: Given qn, some other codewords un2 (i) and (xn1 , yn1 ) are jointly typical, i.e., E1i = {(qn, un2 (i), xn1 , yn1 ) ∈
Tn , i 6= 1}.
Hence, P (E1) at user 1 can be bounded by
P (E1) ≤Pr{E11}+
2nR2∑
i=2
Pr{E1i|EC11}
(a)
≤ + 2n[R2−I(U2;Y1|X1,Q)+3]
(b)
≤δ1(),
where (a) follows from the LLN; and (b) is by the packing lemma [15] if taking R2 ≤ I(U2;Y1|X1, Q).
Similarly. for user 2, the error events are defined as follows
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1) E21: Given qn, the codeword un1 (1) and (xn2 , yn2 ) are not jointly typical, i.e. E21 = {(qn, un1 (1), yn2 , xn2 ) /∈ Tn2,ε};
2) E2i, i 6= 1: Given qn, some other codewords un1 (i) and (xn2 , yn2 ) are jointly typical, i.e., E2i = {(qn, un1 (i), xn2 , yn2 ) ∈
Tn , i 6= 1}.
By the union bound, the error probability P (E2) at user 2 are
P (E2) ≤Pr{E21}+
2nR1∑
i=2
Pr{E2i|EC21}
(a)
≤ + 2n[R1−I(U1;Y2|X2,Q)+3]
(b)
≤δ1(),
where (a) follows from the LLN; and (b) is by the packing lemma [15] if taking R1 ≤ I(U1;Y2|X2, Q).
E. Information Leakage Rate
Now we bound the information leakage rate through b blocks by the block coding scheme. During the whole b blocks, from
block 2 to block b, b − 1 confidential messages (M1)b2 are sent and should be kept secure from the eavesdropper. Here we
use I((M1)b2;Z
b|C1C2) to denote the information leakage through the whole b blocks, and the information leakage rate are
considered averaged over the codes.
I((M1)
b
2;Z
b|C1C2)
=
b∑
j=2
I(M1(j);Z
b|C1C2(M1)bj+1)
(a)
≤
b∑
j=2
I(M1(j);Z
b|C1C2(M1)bj+1K2(j))
=
b∑
j=2
I(M1(j);Z
j |C1C2(M1)bj+1K2(j)) + I(M1(j);Zbj+1|C1C2(M1)bj+1K2(j)Zj)
(b)
=
b∑
j=2
I(M1(j);Z
j |C1C2(M1)bj+1K2(j))
(c)
=
b∑
j=2
I(M1(j);Z
j |C1C2K2(j))
where (a) follows that M1(j) is independent with (K2(j), (M1)bj+1); (b) follows by Markov chain (Z
b
j+1, (M1)
b
j+1, C1, C2)→
(Zj ,K2(j), C1, C2)→ (M1(j), C1, C2). (c) follows that
I(M1(j);Z
j |C1C2(M1)bj+1K2(j))
=H(M1(j)|C1C2K2(j)(M1)bj+1)−H(M1(j)|C1C2K2(j)(M1)bj+1Zj)
(d)
=H(M1(j)|C1C2K2(j))−H(M1(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj)
=I(M1(j);Z
j |C1C2K2(j))
where (d) follows that (M1)bj+1 is independent of M1(j) and Z
j .
13
Hence,
I(M1(j);Z
j |C1C2K2(j))
=I(M1u(j)M1s(j);Z
j |C1C2K2(j))
=I(M1u(j)M1s(j);Z
j−1|C1C2K2(j)) + I(M1u(j)M1s(j);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1)
(a)
= I(M1u(j)M1s(j);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1)
=I(M1s(j);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1) + I(M1u(j);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)) (11)
where (a) follows M1(j) is independent of past transmissions Zj−1, given K2(j).
We bound the two terms separately in (11).
• Consider the first term of (11)
I(M1s(j);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1)
=I(M1s(j), L1L2;Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1)− I(L1L2;Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j))
=I(M1s(j), L1L2;Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1)−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)) +H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)Z(j))
(a)
≤ I(Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1)−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)) +H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)Z(j))
(12)
=H(Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1)−H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2K2(j)Zj−1)
−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)) +H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)Z(j))
(b)
≤H(Z(j)|C1C2K2(j))−H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2K2(j))
−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)) +H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)Z(j))
≤H(Z(j)|C1C2)−H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2K2(j))
−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)) +H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)Z(j))
(c)
=H(Z(j)|C1C2)−H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2)
−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)) +H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)Z(j))
=I(Z(j);Un1 (L1)U
n
2 (L2)|C1C2)−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)) +H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)Z(j))
(d)
≤nI(U1U2;Z)− n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R2k) + n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R2k − I(U1U2;Z) + δ′(ε))
=nδ′(ε)
where (a) follows that (L1, L2) → (Un1 (L1), Un2 (L2)) → Z(j), data processing, and conditioning reduces entropy. (b)
follows that H(Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1) ≤ H(Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)), and
H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2Zj−1)
=H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2)− I(Z(j);Zj−1|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2)
(b1)
= H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2)
where (b1) follows from Markov chain Zj−1 → (Un1 (L1), Un2 (L2))→ Z(j).
(c) follows from
H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2K2(j))
=H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2)− I(Z(j);K2(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2)
(c1)
= H(Z(j)|Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2)C1C2)
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where (c1) follows the Z(j) is independent with K2(j) given Un1 (L1)U
n
2 (L2).
(d) follows from the following three terms. Firstly,
I(Z(j);Un1 (L1)U
n
2 (L2)|C1C2)
≤nI(Zi(j);U1i1(L1)U2i(L2)|C1C2) + n
≤nI(Z;U1U2) + n
The second terms
H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j))
=H(L1L2,M1u(j)⊕K2(j − 1)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j))
≥H(L1L2,M1u(j)⊕K2(j − 1)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)K2(j − 1))
=H(M1u(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)K2(j − 1))
+H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j),M1u(j),K2(j − 1))
(f1)
= H(M1u(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)K2(j − 1)) + n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R1u −R2k)
(f2)
= H(M1u(j)|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)K2(j − 1)) + n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R1u −R2k)
=H(M1u(j)|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)K2(j − 1)) + n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R1u −R2k)
(f3)
= n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R2k)
where (f1) follows from the coding scheme that H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j),M1u(j),K2(j − 1)) = n(R1 +R2 −
R1s −R1u −R2k). (f2) follows the Markov chain
(Zj−1,M1s(j),K2(j))→ (K2(j − 1),M1s(j),K2(j))→ (M1u(j)⊕K2(j − 1),M1s(j),K2(j))
(f3) follows that M1u(j) is independent of (C1C2,K2(j),M1s(j),K2(j−1)) and uniformly distributed over [1 : 2nR1u ].
The third term follows Lemma 1 that H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j)Z(j)) ≤ n(R1+R2−R1s−R2k−I(U1U2;Z)+δ′(ε)),
if R1 +R2 −R1s −R2k > I(U1U2;Z), R1 −R1s > I(U1;Z), R2 −R2k > I(U2;Z).
• Next we bound the second term of (11).
I(M1u(j);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j))
=I(M1u(j)L1L2;Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j))− I(L1L2;Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)M1u(j))
≤I(Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j))−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)M1u(j))
+H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Z(j)M1s(j)M1u(j))
≤I(Un1 (L1)Un2 (L2);Z(j)|C1C2K2(j)M1s(j))−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)M1u(j))
+H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Z(j)M1s(j)M1u(j))
(a)
≤nI(U1U2;Z)−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)M1u(j)) +H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Z(j)M1s(j)M1u(j))
(b)
≤nI(U1U2;Z)−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)M1u(j)) + n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R1u −R2k − I(U1U2;Z) + δ′(ε))
=n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R1u −R2k))−H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)M1u(j)) + nδ′(ε)
(c)
≤n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R1u −R2k))− n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R1u −R2k − δ′′′(ε))
=n(δ′′′(ε))
where (a) follows the same analysis if (12); (b) follows Lemma 1 that H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Z(j)M1s(j)M1u(j)) ≤ n(R1+
R2−R1s−R1u−R2k−I(U1U2;Z)+δ′(ε)), if R1+R2−R1s−R2k−R1u ≥ I(U1U2;Z), R1−R1s−R1u ≥ I(U1;Z),
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R2 −R2k ≥ I(U2;Z).
(c) follows that
H(L1L2|C1C2K2(j)Zj−1M1s(j)M1u(j)) = n(R1 +R2 −R1s −R2k −R1u)
F. Rate Analysis
Consider all the conditions are fulfilled to keep confidential messages transmission.
R1 = R1u +R1s +R1x
R2 = R2 +R2k +R2x
R1s = R1u +R1s
R1u ≤ R2k
R2 +R2k +R2x ≤ I(U2;Y1|X1, Q)
R1u +R1s +R1x ≤ I(U1;Y2|X2, Q)
R1x +R2 +R2x ≥ I(U1U2;Z)
R1x ≥ I(U1;Z)
R2 +R2x ≥ I(U2;Z)
After the Fourier-Motzkin elimination, the achievable secrecy rate region are the union of non-negative rate pairs (R1s, R2)
satisfying
R1s ≤ I(U1;Y2|X2, Q) + I(U2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(U1U2;Z)
R1s ≤ I(U1;Y2|X2, Q)− I(U1;Z)
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y1|X1, Q)
over all p(q)p(u1|q)p(u2|q)p(x1|u1)p(x2|u2), when I(U2;Y1|X1, Q) ≥ I(U2;Z).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof:
First, we consider R2.
nR2 =H(M2) = H(M2|M1)
=I(M2;Y
n
1 |M1, Xn1 ) +H(M2|M1, Y n1 , Xn1 )
(a)
≤ I(M2;Y n1 |M1, Xn1 ) + n
=
n∑
i=1
I(M2;Y1i|M1, Y i−11 , Xn1 ) + n
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi−11 , X
n
1,i+1, X2i,M2, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1i|X1i) + n
=
n∑
i=1
I(X2i;Y1i|X1i) + I(Xi−11 , Xn1,i+1,M2, Y i−11 ;Y1i|X2i, X1i) + n
=
n∑
i=1
I(X2i;Y1i|X1i) + n
=nI(X2;Y1|X1) + n.
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Now We define the following auxiliary random variables to proceed to R1s.
Ui = X
i−1
2 Y
i−1
2 Z
n
i+1, Vi = (W1, Ui) (13)
R1s =H(M1) ≤ H(M1|Zn) + n
=H(M1|Zn)−H(M1|Y n2 , Xn2 ) +H(M1|Y n2 , Xn2 )
=H(M1)− I(M1;Zn)−H(M1) + I(M1;Y n2 , Xn2 )
+H(M1|Y n2 Xn2 )
=− I(M1;Zn) + I(M1;Y n2 , Xn2 ) +H(M1|Y n2 , Xn2 )
(a)
≤ I(M1;Xn2 , Y n2 )− I(M1;Zn) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
[I(M1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 )− I(M1;Zi|Zni+1)] + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
[I(M1, Z
n
i+1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 )− I(Zni+1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 ,M1)
− I(M1, Xi−12 , Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1) + I(Xi−12 , Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1,M1)] + nδn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(M1, Z
n
i+1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 )− I(M1, Xi−12 , Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1)] + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Zni+1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 ) + I(M1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)
− I(Xi−12 , Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1)− I(M1;Zi|Xi−12 , Y i−12 Zni+1)] + nδn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(M1;X2i, Y2i|Xi−12 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)− I(M1;Zi|Xi−12 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)] + nδn (14)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Vi;X2i, Y2i|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui)] + nδn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(V ;X2, Y2|U)− I(V ;Z|U)] + nδn
=n[I(V ;X2, Y2|U)− I(V ;Z|U)] + nδn (15)
where (a) follows by the Fano’s inequality; (b) follows from the Csisza´r sum identity [15]; (c) follows by defining Ui =
(Xi−12 , Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1) and Vi = (M1, Ui) in (13). and (d) is by introducing a time-sharing random variable Q, and define
U = (UQ, Q) and V = (VQ, Q), X2 = X2Q, Y2 = Y2Q, Z = ZQ, then
I(V ;X2Y2|U)− I(V ;Z|U)
=I(VG, G;X2GY2G|UG, G)− I(VG, G;ZG|UG, G)
=I(VG;X2GY2G|UG, G) + I(G;X2GY2G|UG, VG, G)
− I(VG;ZG|UG, G)− I(G;ZG|UG, VG, G)
=I(VG;X2GY2G|UG, G)− I(VG;ZG|UG, G)
17
The equivocation rate (15)
R1s ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(Vi;X2iY2i|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui)] + nδn
=n[I(VG;X2GY2G|UG, G)− I(VG;ZG|UG, G)] + nδn
≤n[I(V ;X2Y2|U)− I(V ;Z|U)] + nδn (16)
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